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The Property Risghts of Married Women is a subject
that has recently been agitating the minds of both legisla-
tors and jurists, but it h-s not, until within the last fif-
tv, years, been dealt with to further the rights of the
feme-covert more than they were at the comncn law; which,
in this respect, did not fulfill the demancs of justice,-
es is the purpose of the whole system of jurisprudence.
Certain it is that the subject is one of rrreat impor-
tance, and one with which every member of the legal pro-
fession should be familiar.
I propose in this wvork to give first, the basis on
which legislation is founded second, the doctrine in equity
and third, the various statutes and enactments that have
been passed in Pennsyrlvania.
Until recently the subject has not been definitely,
settle d.
7c'ouler, in his "Domestis Pelations," in accountin-
for the conflict of cases, states that the confusion a-
rises from the different schemes that are at the founda-
tion of the property rights of "arried parties.
1st. The Common-law Property qche-e which is tie
basis of our jurisprudence, and in which the unityr of the
'arriage relation is the primarv point.
To secure this unity the 1aw starts with the assum-
ption that the wife's legal existence is suspended or
7tin.riished du-rrn covertuie. T he has no rirdit or in-
tersest In the husband's rropertv, whether it be acquired
hefo-e or durinr cov.erture, except dower in his -eal estate
and a right of inheritance to his propertyr,- of which he
can usuallv deprive her.
The husband, on the other hand, loses nothing of his
independence by marria-e, but is entitled to all the wife's
personal property in possession absolutel,, and to all
)utstanding debts or choses in action if he reduce them to
possession,- which he can do, as he has all control over
them. He also has a right to the use of her real estate,
and a possibility of a future estate as tenant by the
curtesr.
If the wife survive the husband, she takes only her
real estate, such choses in action as have not been re-
duced to the husband's possession, and her paraphernalia.
As an attempt to equalize the burdens of marriage,
the husband is obliged to pali all debts contracted by the
wife while a feme-sole, and liable for all just debts in-
curred for her support while the marriage relation exists.
And if there is a debt between parties to a marriage con-
tract, marriage extinguishes it.
The rife can not sue o- be sued in her own name, nor
can she bind herself bu her contract, though she may bind
her husband as agent, either where the husband has failed
to furnish the necessary supyort,- and she has done noth-
ing to absolve him from his duty- or where she acts as
his agent, and mar bind him to the extent of her author-
ity.
2nd. The Civil Law Property Scheme which pays lit-
tle rerard to the idea of unity, but rather considers the
husband and wife as distinct persons, with separate rights
and capable of holding distinct and separate estates.
The wife was responsible for her debts, and competent to
sue and be sued on her own contracts; and her property
could not be subject to anr liability or engagement of
the husband. This is found in the Roman law prior to
the time of Justinian.
3rd. The Cormnunity Property Scheme which is inter-
mediate to the Civil and Common Law Schemes. This is
also thought to have been part of the Roman law, but at
an earlier period than the Civil Law Scheme.
The relation between husband and wife under this
Scheme is similar to the partnership relation, and the
community property is primarily liable for payment of
debts. This partnership applies to all property ac-
quired during marriage, and debts must be satisfied first
out of the corinurity property or est ate. Sometimes the
community is iiversal, comprising all property had be-
fore, or at the time of mar-iage, as well as that acquir-
ed during coverture. This Scheme is of very little im-
portance, and in states where it is in use the tendency
is to limit, rather than extend it.
As was said before, the Common Law Scheme is the ba-
sis of our jrrlIsprudence. As the eyes of the reople
were opened they saw that the married womTen had no legal
existence,- that with a single exception she had no rigbts
and that the set forms of the Common Law could not afford
the required protection. But what the law could not do,
equity did, and created in the married woman a separate
estate, so that her existence is no longer lost in that
of her husband. And, though she is not as independent
as before marriage, she may, when the interests of her-
self and heqr husband conflict, contract on her own behalf,
sue and be sued in hir own name, and hold lands, goods,
and chattels in her own right,- which property is known
as her separate estate, or an estate limited to her sep-
arate use.
The question of primary impnrtance then, was,
What will amount to a separate estate? From the various
cases we find that the separate estate may be created by
any express statement in a conveyance stipulating that
the property or fund is not to be subject to the hus-
band's control, and, though no particular words are nec-
essary, there must be a clear intent to bar the husband's
marital right. (Trltt v Colwell, 31 Pa. St. 228.)
If the wonan be married, o- in immediate contemplation
of marriag-e, a conve-ance fo- her ovn uise will create in
her a separate estate, as where there was a devise to a
widow, for life, with proviso that, in case of marriage,
her husband should have no dominion over hir propert-r.
(Craig v Watts, 8 Watts 498.)
It is also held that if the wife be living apart
from her husband, under articles of separation, and ac-
quires personal property by hr unaided labor, she ma,7
regard it as separate estate and dispose of it by will
or otherwise. (Wagner's Estate. 2 Ash 448.)
Again, if the wife be deserted by her husband,-
though a court of law would not give her justice- equity
will allow her the earnings of her own labor. (Spier's
Appeal. 26 Pa. St. 233.) But, if the legal title is
vested in the feme, there is no separate estate. (Todd's
Appeal. 24 Pa. St. 429,) nor is there one if there is a
devise to a married daughter with limitation to her heirs
in case of her death. (Krause v Beitel. 3 Rawle 199.)
In McBride v Smyth, 54 Pa. St. 245, it is held that
a devise in trust for a daurhter will not create a sep-
arate use unless she be married, or in !Trnediate contem-
plation of marrIiare. But if she be divorced from her
husband, or voluntarily withdraws from him, in the event
of separation such trust is for hqr separate use. (Perry
v Boilean, 10 S. & R. 208.)
A married woman may make a loan to her husband from
her separate estate and he would become her debtor by
piving a certificate that he had borrowed money from her.
(Hind's Estate, 5 Wharton, 138.) Although such certifi-
cate would be void as a contract, yet the object intended
was the use of the wife's money consistent with her ow-
nership. The Court of Equity looks to the intent rather
than to the foyi, and will interpret it so as to produce
the results which the parties intended.
Thourh equityr did a great deal to give the married
voman her rights, there was ret a great Inequality as to
the mari+al obligations. But, in the onward march of
reform, modern legislators, actuated by a spirit of jus-
tice and wisdom, have, to a great extent, remedied thq
injustice of the Common Law.
On the eleventh of April, 1848 an act was passed in
the Pennsirlvania Legislature intending tr secuire the
rights of married women. The act provided in substance
and effect, "That every species of' property belonrlig to
an,, single woman shall continue to be er property as
fully after her marriage as before, and that all such
property of whatever kind, which shall accrue to any mar-
ried woman during coverture, shall be owned and enjoyed
by such married woman as h-r own separate propertr; and
that anif such property shall not be liable for debts or
liabilities of the husband, nor sold, mortgaged, trans-
ferred, or encumbered by him in any way, without her con-
sent acknowledged before any judge of court of comm~on
pleas."
The principal object of this statute, or its general
intent, was to prevent the wife's property from being
swept away by a husband's creditors. As the law was be-
fore the passage of the statute, the husband, by marri-
age, became the absolute owner of the wife's choses in
possession, both those she had at the time of marriage
and those that she subsequently acquired. He was en-
titled to the use and enjoyment of her real estate, own-
ing its rents, issues and profits. As a natural conse-
quence, all the property she brought to h'r husband, ex-
cept a remaindir i rcl es+a+e after his death, we3 li-
able tr be seized and sold at the suit of his creditors.
Thiis, the wife who had brcmight, proper+,, to h-r husband
mirht see it all swept al,,a, T and herself left. destitute,
through +he improvidence, misfortune, or even vice of her
husband. It may have gone to pa.T debts contracted be-
fo-e marriage, from which the wife received no benefit
whatever. Such a state of affairs could not but appeal
strongly to the synpathy of the legislators.
As a matter of course, a gvrea+ deal of litigation
grew out of the passage of this act, and the courts were
called upon to interpret or construe it. One of the
first questions that arose was whether the statute should
be liberally or strictly construed.
In the earlier cases the courts have taken the strict,
or literal interpretation. Placing this construction
on the statute it works a radical change in the status
of the feme-covert, giving her power to dispose of her
separate estate, by will or otherwise, as a feme-sole.
The married woman must also be considered as a feme-sole
in regard to anir estate, of whatever name or sort, owned
by her before marriage, or any which shall accrue to her
durring coverture by, will, descent, deed of convelrance or
otherwise.
Later cases in the Supreme Court have over-ruled the
earlier decisions, interpreting the statute according to
its spirit and intention.
Blackstone tells us that there are three points to
be considered in construing a remedial statute,- the old
law, the mischief, and the remedy- and also that it is
+he business of the judges so to construe the act as to
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
The later decisions hold that this act means nothing
more than a protection against the husband's creditors,
and that the intention is the same in case of property
Theld before marriage as to that acquired during marriage.
It prevents the husband from acquiring property1 in the
wife's choses in possession, from reducing choses in act-
ion to his possession, and also defeats his right to use
real propnrtv,- ti'is removing the whole estate from reach
of creditors and prpserving it for the wife.
It could not have been the intention of the Legis-
lature to inpai tie unity or intimacv, of the marriage
relation. This must necessaril-v -esult if a s~rict or
lfteral interpretation be placed on the statute. If the
husband must ask the consent of the wife eve r- time he
should wish to use her furniture or house there would be
a serious impairing of this relation.
The husband, at the Common Law, was the trustee of
the wife's equitr-ble estate if there was no one lname d in
+he instrument creating the estate,- and his right in
this direction has not been changed. And the same rule
is applied to the separate earnings of the wife under the
statute, as was used in eqiit$,.r before its passage.
If the husband's interest in the wife's real estate
is sold, the purchaser can not recover possession in an
action of ejectment against him, as the act protects both
title and possession of the wife's interest in her separ-
ate property, (MCElfatrick v Hicks, 21 Pa. St. 402) and
in a clear case, a creditor may be restrained by injunet-
ion from levying upon and selling the wife's real estate
for her husband's debts. (Hunter's Appeal, 40 Pa. St.
194.) But the wife must show, by evidence which does
not admit of a reasonable doubt, that the property, was
purchased from her own separate estate or the presumpt-
ion is that the goods were purchased out of means fur-
nished by the husband. (Flick v Devries, 50 Pa. St. 266.)
It is not enough that the wife had means of paying the-e
must be proof of actual payment by her, out rf h,r sepa . -
ate funds, (Gault v Saffin, 44 Pa. St. 307,) tPough this
rule is not required as to creditors. Koechline v
Keichline 54 Pa. St. 75, holding that: "Except as against
creditors the wife is only bound to establish her title
by an ordinary derree of proof."
Althouph this act prevents the husband from encum-
bering her property, yet the wife can not convey her real
estate by deed without joining her husband, nor create a
lease without his concurrence; nor execute an obligation
for payment of money, or give bond or warrant of attor-
ne',,- in fact, her powers to contract are not enlarged to
any great extent.
It is provided that the husband shall not be liable
for debts of the wife contracted before marriage, and in
Biery v Ziegler, 93 Pa. St. 367, it is held that a hus-
band is not liable for rent of a house leased to the wife
before marriage, though she continue to live in it for
some time after the ceremony was performned. The separ-
ate property of the wife may be taken for such debts,
however, and no wrong will result to the creditors.
The wife may have power to contract in three cases:
1st. Where the contract is to carry on her separate
trade or business.
2nd. Whe-e the contract is made in relation to, or
for the benefit of, her separate estate.
3rd. \Where the intention to charge her separate es-
tate is expressed in the instrument or contract by which
the liability is created, or may be clearly implied from
the circumstances.
In any of these three cases the wife mar have power
to contract without consent or approval of her husband.
In the first case, if the husband shall refuse or neglect
to provide for the wife,- either from drunkenness or pro-
fligacv, or any other cause,- or shall desert her, the
wife is allowed to have all the privileges of a feme-sole
trader,- that is, all propertr acquired, of whatever kind,
is her own, and subject to her free and absolute disposal
durinp life, by will or otherwise, v.ithout an,, interfer-
ence on the part of her husband,- and in case of her in-
testacy, her next of kin shall take as if h-r husband
were dead. She may also sue and be sued without joining
her husband.
The statute means mo'ro than the mere rentinq of a
house, or the buying of a single article,- it has refer-
ence to business pursuits, mechanical, manufacturing, or
commercial. The mere care and supervision of lands and
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property owned by a feme-covert is not the carrying on of
a separate trade or business. If ! v'ere so, eves7f mar-
ried worian who owns a house and garden, or had a deposit
4n a bank would be a tradeswoman.
Under the act of Mair 4, 185, it is not necessary
that th'e wuife be decreed a feme-sole trader in order to
entitle her to the benefits of the act as to holding or
conveying her property in her own name. She can not be
held liable as a feme-sole trader unless she be engaged
in some trade or business or emplnyment pursued b', her
for a livelihood. She mavr convevr her real estate with-
out her husband joining in the deed, (Wilson v Coursin
72 Pa. St. 300) and such conve,,ance w!ill bar his rights
as tenant b' the curtesy.
This act secures to the deserted wife not merely the
rights and privileges of a feme-sole trader under prior
acts, but it also confers upon her the absolute and un-
qualified right to dispose of her own prop-erty, real and
personal, as it ma, seem best to her; and if she die in-
testate, her next of kin takes the property as though the
husband were dead. The fact that a feme-sole trader is
living with her husband does not take away her privileges
under this act.
Among the questions that arose as to +his act of
1S55 was one as to its constitutlonalitv. This was
brought up in M6ninger v Retnnv, 104 Pa. S-. 298.
In this case the husband claimed that the act was uncon-
sti+1tional and void, as it infringed on some marital
rights. But the coiirt held that the act was founded on
the very reason that the ma-riage contract had been vio-
lated, and it would not be rig7ht for the husband to claim
his marital righ+s after his ovm misconduct in violating
his marriage con t ract.
The married woman may be decreed feme-sole by p-e-
senting a petition setting forth any circumstances as to
desertion byr her husband, or his willful neglect or re-
fusal t o pvovide for her, if such petition be substanti-
ated by twro witnesses, and the court sees fit. The hus-
band, by such willful neglect, or refusal to provlde, or
b-v his desertion for one year or more, loses all right as
tenant by the curtesiy and also his rights under the in-
testate laws.
The second place where the wife has power to con-
tract is in regard to improving and repairing he- separ-
ate estate. This she may do at any time and under an,.
circumstances. The statute provides that the husband
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shall not encumber the estate in ani wa-,, and if the wife
did not have this polwer given her, the estate might be-
come untenantable, or sink into decay. ITcowrvj, , if an-,
action is brought it mus t aver her covertlie and 'hat tlle
debt was contract,-d upon her a,tho , tv and was for the
improverent of her epara+e es+ate. Fo in Dearie v
Martin, 78 Pa. St. 55, a mechanic's lein was filed against
the proprt7 of a married woman, withoLt averring tlhe co-
verture and that the labor done and mate rial furnished
upon her authority or by her consent was for the improve-
ment of her separate estate, and is held as fatally de-
fective and void. Llo,d v Hibbs, 81 Pa. St. 306,' and
Schriffer v Saum 81 Pa. St. 385, holding the same way.
Yet, if judgment be had after service, and stands unre-
versed, it may not be attacked collaterally, and a sale
by, the sheriff will pass a good title.
But where the wife furnishes money or its equivalent
from her separate estate and receives the benefit of it
in common with her hisband, she is not allowed to recover
it as a portion of her separate estate. In Gleghorn v
Gleghorn, 118 Pa. St. 383, a bill was filed in equitT byr
a wife, against her husband, to recover a sum of money
expended by her to aid in the erection of a dwelling for
their common home upon real estate fThrnish- d b- him.
The court held that where the wife's moneyr is reclived
b" t he husband and appropr-iat'd b1 him, at her request,
towards the building of a dwelling hoiise for the common
home of both, without circumstances indicating the re-
lation of debtor and creditor, the wife maV not reclaim
the money by a subsequent rroceeding against the husband.
Thouph the holding would probably have been different if
it had been shown that the intention of the parties was
that the money furnished by the wife 'shonld be used as
her separate property, or if she had made it as a loan
to her husband.
On this point it is also held that judgment given
b1T a justice-of-the-peace against a married woman, in a
joint action against husband and wife, is void unless the
record shows that the debt for which the suit was brought
was contracted by the wife and incurred for articles nec-
essar-V for support of said husband and wife. (Gould v
McFall, Ill Pa. St. 66.)
The next class of cases where the wife is allowed
to contr-act is where the intention to charge her separate
estate is expressed in the instrument or con+tract by
which the liabilit- r is created, or where it mayr be clear-
-v Implied.
In these cases g-ea, stress is laid uron the point
that there must be some intene on to charge,- this jnt-n-
tion may be expressod or implied, b9 t it must be there.
It is no' necessnry, tl nt the wife bind herself in writ-
ing, a parol agreement to charge is enough if it be for
the benefit of her separate estate.
Where the debts are contracted for necessaries the
wife's estate can not be charred unless execution has
been returned unsatisfied against the husband. In the
case of Bair v Robinson, 103 Pa. St. 247, the wife was
held liable for the funeral expenses of her mother, who
had lived and died in her household,-.the husband having
no estate. Held to be necessary for the support and
maintenance of 1he family of such married wonan.
In such cases the c1-7dltor can not recover unless
he prove that the wife contract'd the debt, and that +he
articles were necessary for the sirnort of the family of
husband and wife. The wording of the statute is:
"Judgment shall not be 1,ndered against the wife in such
joint action unless it shall have been proved that the
debt sued for in such action was contractued by the wife,
or incurred for necessaries for the support of the family
of husband and wife." The courts have inte rpreted the
word "or" as meaning and,- thus making it necessary tr
urovo that it, vTs both contracted b ti . wife, and that
the debt contractjd, was fo- necessa-_4es.
It is held a sufficient declaratin, aVhe-c! a ma,-ried
woman is cha-ged ;r;th labilitv, on a contract made with
her for labo- done,, that "said work having been done at
her request in and about the management of her separate
es-ate, and necessarT for the preservation, enjoyment,
use and profit of said separate istate." (Botts v Knabb,
116 Pa. St. 28.)
The courts also held that this section does not ap-
ply to debts contracted for necessaries before the passage
of the act.
Until the act of 22 April, 1863, this act allowed
the same rules to arply to an- conveyance of prorerty b,
a married woman which took effect subsequent to act of
1948, unless such case had been adjudicated by the Su-
preme Court.
If the feme-covert had no power to convey, the Leg-
islature cannot validate such deed of conveyance.
(Shonk v Brown, 61 Pa. St. 321.) And 17 tne wife have
separate property conveyed to her by will and there is a
restrictive clause in the will with-holding the right to
encumber the property, the statute does not affect such
clause, and she can not transfer such estate.
The wIfe may, be sued alone in case the husband shall
have deserted her, or separated himself from her for one
,rear or more, and is living out of +he coiutv ,K'>-re she
resides so that service of process cannot be had against
both. In such case she may be sued for necessaries for
support of family, if her separate estate wouid have been
liable 7_indr' the existing laws; or if the debts were con-
tractec! for rerairs or improvements on her separate es-
tate. And by t - S-econd Section of the Act of 11 June,
1870, she may bring action against her husband in such
case of desertion, or where she has been abandoned or
driven from her home by her husband,- and need not bring
i+ bir her next friend, or trustee, as she was formerlr
requirerl to ro.
Until the act of 25 April, 1850, was passed it was
thought tha+ the ,rife could bS'ng suit in her own name as
ferne-sole, or join her husband to recover her prop,-Y~tv.
Section 20 of that act r-'nvides that suits for te -'ecov-
-ry of an-, prop--T+ ' of a married woman ma-T be brouiiht in
name of such ma-rid wcman and her husband. If +he
action is broufht against th-i husband and wife 'nde the
act of 18'8, with a view rf charging 'he wife's separa+e
estate, she may appeal without the husband joining in the
appeal.
In an action for pre'sonal injuries to a married wom-
an, .the action should be b-'orpht b-r the husband and wife;
but the husband must file a stipulation that he will not
bring any action in his own name to recover damages, and
that any damages recovered shall be for the separate use
of the wife.
The wife ma-T loan money to her husband and take, as
securit",, a judgment or mortpage against his estate in
the name of a third p-rson who shall act as tumsteQ for
h ". This authority implies a rower to arrange the terms
of the loan and to provide for the payment of both inter-
est and principal,- thus assuming tlhe character of a con-
tract binding on both parties. If it should appear' +hat
there was coercion or fraud practiced by the husband in
securing the loan, the courts will compel immediate pay-
ment to the wife. And where a married woman has entered
into such an n.reerent she can not rescind It on nrocur-
In- a divorce from h-?r hushand, unless coercion or fraud
is shown on his part.
If thTe hushad has deserted or refused to provide for
tTe wife, or if shie he divorced from his b,,d and board,
shie may hrinp an action of slander or libel raianst hin
throuph her rext friend.
Portions of te act of 11 April, 1948 were repealed
h, acts of 11 April, 1356, and 14 Mair, 1874.
lst. As to the acknowledre?-et of the deed or mort-
are of married women, and
2nd. As to whom it should be ackno,'-leded before.
In the first of tlese acts the repeal was of so much
of tbe act of 1848 as required the consent of a married
woman to be first had and obtained, or the acknowledge-
ment of her deed and mortage when conveyring her real es-
tate to be made differentl", from that which she is au-
thorized to make when she joins her husband in conveying
real estate.
The second act repeals the portion requiring the
deeds or mort aees to be acknowledged before one of the
jures of the court of common pleas, and enacting that
the,, m",,l be acknowlecired before any officer authorized
to take acknowledgements.
As to the separate earnings rf a married woman;-
whether the- shall be as wages for labor, salarv, pror-
-rtv, lrsrsiness or oth-wise- the , will inure and ace-e
to -he sonara+e benefit and iise of said married woman,
and are under her exclusive control, and not suhiec to
claim of her husband or his creditors.
As therq mic-ht be some fraudulent rractices in re-
Pard to this portion of the act, the Le~islature further
provid-d that if the married woman wished to take advan-
tage of this rrovision, she must present a petition, un-
der oath or affirmation, to the court of common pleas,
stating her intention to claim the benefits of such act.
This petition must he filed or recorded and is made con-
clusive evidence of intention of such woman.
If a married woman who has become entitled to her
separate earnings, under act of April 3, 1872, borrow
money on h' r personal credit, whether possessed of a sep-
arate estate or not, and therewith in good faith purchase
a stock of !oods with which to en~aze in business, the
goods may not be seized and sold for a debt of her hus-
band. (Orr v Barnstein, 124 Pa. St. 311.) When such
right to property is found to exist her husband may not
onlyT act as he " agent, but he has a leral right to give
her his labor and skill in conducting such business, and
his creditors can not sell her property, produeed by his
skill and labor, for his debts.
Although the wife can not brin7 an action of debt
arainst her husband, either alone or b h-r next friend,
it is held In Frefler v Freller 1P6 Pa. St. 470, that
a married woman joinred with heqr husband may~ maintain an
action arafnst the firm of which he is a member, and re-
cover damages for a breach of covenant in a lease of her
real estate. The hiusband, though served with the writ,
making default of appearance and plea. The firm acquires
no ripght of the husband to make a defence of coverture
and can not use it to shield themselves from the Just
claims of their creditors.
If the husband of a married woman has been found to
be a lunatic, by a court of competent 'urlsdiction writhin
t'lv, crnmon 1 t', and the wife owns land in fee simple,
or othe-7v4-sc, she ma-T conver the same b- deed or mortgage,
subject to rig!-ts of the Tisband unde? t- e intes+ate laws,
without his joining in the deed.
One reculiari+', in +he statrte is +ha+ th is an
express provisinn that if a married woman contract for
the purchase of sewing machines for her orn use, the con-
tract shall be valid and binding without he necessity? of
having the husband join in the contract. I can find no
reason for making this express designation of sewing ma-
chines rather than other articles for household use.
As the legislators have enacted that the wife should
have her separate estate it was necessar-, to give her the
power of dispositlon over it. Section 14 of act of 1 -
April, 1848, provides,that "Any marrir:d woman mayT dispose,
by her last will and testament, of her separate propertir,
real, personal or mixed- whether the same accrue to her
before or during coverture."' And this provision is not
limited to propnyr-r acquired after the passage of the act.
If the married woman dies without making disposit-
ion of her property,, it will be distributed as provided
for in the intestate laws. The husband is not deprived
of his estate as tenant by the curtesy, but is entilled
to enjoyr it the same as at common Law. But during the
life of the wife he had no power to sell lease, or in anyr
wa , affect her real estate, as he had no present inte -es.
theeein.
Some legislation arose fr-om this section of the
statute, and by an act of 22 April, l80, explanato-r of
act of 1843, it was p-ovided that the act of 1348 was not
intended to affect the veste-d rights of husbands, and
that his estate by the crtesI is exempt from levy during
the life of the wife. And h,, act of L April, 1863, it
was enacted that "No judgment obtained against a married
man before or during marriage shall bind or be a lien
upon the wife's separate estate or any interest the hus-
band *maT have as tenant by the curtesy."
The sRine provision exists as to the husband as ex-
ists in favor of the wife in regard to electin7 whether
to take under will or under the statutory intestate law.
Another privilege granted to married women was the
right to be the incorporators and officers in any corpora-
tion organized for the purpose of learninr, benevolence,
charity, or religion, - makin7 marriage no disability.
The legislation on this subject seeiis to have culmin-
ated in the Married Persons Property Act of 3 June 1887,
by which the married woman is practically set free from the
disabilities of coverture.
The enactment is as followvs:-
1st. Marriare shall not be held to impose any disability
on or incapacity in a married woman cs to the acquisition,
ownership, possession, control, use or disposition of prop-
ertyof any kind in aiy trade or business in which she may
engage, or for necessaries, and for the use, enjoyment and
improvement of her spearate estate, real or personal, or
her right and power to make contract of any kind, ard to
give oblirations, bindir' herself therefore; but every mar-
ried woman shall have the same right to acquire, hold, ros-
sess, irmnrove, control, use or dispose of her property
real and pe-sonal, in possession or expectancy, in the same
manner as if she were feme sole, without the intervention of
any trustee, and with all the rights ard liabilities inci-
de'nt the-eto,.exc--nt -s her-in provided, as if she were not
married; and property of every kind owned, acauired or
earned byr a woman, before or during her marriarre shall be-
lo-rr to Tier and not to her hushsa-d, or his creditors.
Provided, however, that a married woman shall have no power
to mortgage or convey her real estate unless her husband
joins in such mortgage or conveyrace.
2nd. The married woman shall be capable of entering into
and rendering herself liable upon a-v contract, relating
to any trade or business in which she may engate, or for
necessaries, and for the use, enjoyment and improverent
of her separate estate, and for suir' or being sued, either
upon such contract or for torts done to or cornitted by he9
in all respects as if she were a feme sole and her husband
need not -e joined F-s plain tiff or defendant, or be made -
party to anir action, suit, or legal proceeding of anyr kind
brought by or against her in her individual rirht.
3rd. Any debt, damages or costs recover-d by her in any
such action, suit or proceeding shall be her separate prop-
erty and any debt, damages or costs recovered against her
in anir such action, suit or other proceeding shall be pay-
able out of her separate property and not otherwise.
4th. 11othinp in this or any preceding section shall enable
a married woman to become accomodation endorsor, guarantor,
or surety for another.
5th. A Married woman ma,7 make, execute and deliver leases
of her property, real and personal, and assignment, trans-
fers and sales of her separate personal property, and notes,
bills, drafts, bonds or obligations of any kind, and ap-
point attorneys to act for her, and it shall not be nec-
essary for her husband to be made a party therein.
dth. Husband and wife shall have the same civil remedies
upon contracts in their own name and riht, against all
persons for the protection, and recovery of their separate
property, as unmarried persons.
7th. A married woman mav dispose of her property, real and
personal, by last will and testament in writing, signed by
her or manifested by her mark or cross made by her, at thp
end thereof in the same manner as if she were unmarried.
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In Small v Small 129 Pa. 't. 366 it is held that the Mar-
ried Prrsons Prope rty Act of 3 June 1887 does not author-
ize the wife to sue her husband directly and in her own
name for the recovery of money received hy him from her
separate estate. Although the languape of Sect. 6th.,
takino in itself is perhapq, broad enough to include an
action by one directly against the other, but the act as
a whole canrnt fairly he construed as authorizing such an
actior.
Until 18A8 the people had not held liberal views as to
the married woman's status, - or if they had, these views
had not found expression. From that time to this, the
tendency has been to increase h-r rickets; but as her prop-
erty rights are enlarred so are her liabilities, and
where she is allovrd to hold a separate estate that s'ep-
arate estate is still liable for debts contracted by her-
self and for the benefit of silch estate.
The statute has had very little effect on the rights
of the husband, but it has remedied a rreat defect in re-
moving the liability of ha-rin the wife's property swept
away for the husband's dbts.
At the present time the-e are few, if any chanfes to
be made to better the condition of the married woman in -
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-ard to her property rights. The last enactment it may
be said, 'hs swept away the last vestige of bondage that
remained to mark the existence of the Common Law.
The legislators of Pe-lrpylvanti,may look vith pride
on the advancement they have made, as well as on the fact
that they stand wit the legislators of New 'lork as the
pioneers of the movement.
Tritt v Colwell,
Craig v Watts,
Warner's Estate,
Spier's Appeal,
Todd's W
Krause v Beitel,
MCBride v Smnth,
PerryT v Boilean,
Hind's Estate,
MCElfatrick v Hicks,
Hunter's Appeal,
Flick v Devries,
Gault v Saffin,
Keichline v Keichline,
Biery v Ziegler,
CASES CITED.
31 Pa. St. 228,
Watts 498,
Ash 448,
I- Pa. St.
,0 W
14 It it
3 Rawl e
4 Pa. St.
0 S. &: R.
5 Wharton
I Pa. St.
L II 1!
50 Pa.
44 "
St.
WI
233,
429,
190,
24 5,
208,
138,
402,
194,
266
307,
54 1 " 75,
93 it 367,
P ge.
5
5
11
ii
Wilson v Coursin,
Moninger v Retner,
Dearne v Martin,
Lloyd v Hibbs,
Schriffer v Saum,
Gleghorn v Gleghorn,
Gould v McFall,
Fair v Robinson,
Bott- v Knabb,
Shonk v Brown,
Orr v B reti,
Frell'r v FreiPl'r,
St.
it
306,
299,
7P Pa.
104 It
72 It
81
81 ,
118
108
116
61
124"
126
Page.
13
14
15
15
15
15
16
17
18
12
"I 55,
i 30U,
" 385,
" 383,
" 247,
" 28,
" 321,
311,
470,

